A $20,000+ Web Development Lead Almost Led Us Into a Malware Trap. Here's What Happened.

Running a web development agency means receiving inquiries from all kinds of potential clients. Some need simple websites. Others need complex applications, custom software, or full-scale digital platforms.

As the owner of Think1 Designs and Web Design Doers, I'm always looking for new opportunities to help businesses bring their ideas to life.

But recently, I experienced something that reminded me just how important cybersecurity is, especially when dealing with new clients.

What started as an exciting project inquiry with a budget exceeding $20,000 quickly turned into something much more concerning.

A professional-looking lead, a convincing software project, an NDA requirement, and a Dropbox link all seemed reasonable at first.

Then I started connecting the dots.

This is what happened, what I discovered, and why I believe every web development agency, freelancer, and software engineer should understand this type of attack.

It Started With a $20,000+ Project Inquiry

On October 27, 2026, Think1 Designs received a new lead through our website.

The potential client submitted a request for web development services, indicated a budget of more than $20,000, and described a project involving over 10 pages.

The project sounded substantial.

They wanted to create an education credential verification platform, a system that would allow educational institutions to issue digital academic credentials, students to access and share those credentials, and employers or government organizations to verify their authenticity.

This wasn't a typical website project.

It was potentially a complete software-as-a-service (SaaS) platform involving user authentication, institutional dashboards, document management, verification systems, security controls, and backend infrastructure.

For an agency like ours, that kind of project immediately gets your attention.

And the idea itself was legitimate. Companies such as Parchment and Accredible already operate platforms with similar functionality.

At first, there was no obvious reason to dismiss the inquiry.

My First Step Was to Research the Company

Before committing time to a proposal, I wanted to understand who we were dealing with.

The inquiry came from someone claiming to represent a technical services company, using an email address associated with a professional-looking domain.

I started checking the company's online presence.

A few details stood out.

The domain appeared in a list of newly observed registrations dated October 27, 2026, the same day the inquiry arrived.

I also couldn't verify an established company website or independently confirm the contact's connection to the business.

Now, a new domain doesn't automatically mean something is wrong.

Startups register domains every day. Plenty of legitimate founders look for developers before they have a website, employees, or an established online presence.

So I didn't immediately write off the lead.

Instead, I decided to continue the conversation while remaining cautious.

The First Email Exchange Seemed Completely Normal

I responded professionally on behalf of Think1 Designs.

I explained that the requested platform aligned with the type of custom software development we could potentially deliver.

I also invited the client to schedule a discovery call so we could discuss their requirements, development priorities, budget, and timeline.

The response arrived quickly.

The potential client said they were happy to discuss the project but needed us to complete a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) first.

That didn't immediately concern me.

NDAs are common in software development, especially when clients want to protect proprietary business logic, technical requirements, or confidential plans.

I agreed that we could review the NDA before discussing the project in greater detail.

I simply requested that they provide the document in PDF format.

That's when the situation changed.

The NDA Wasn't a PDF. It Was Inside a Git Repository.

The next email explained that the NDA couldn't be sent separately.

According to the sender, their process required all project-related documentation to remain in a single controlled repository.

They provided a Dropbox link to a compressed archive named:

Education_Credential_Verification_Project.tar.gz

The email claimed the archive contained project documentation, including the platform vision, MVP scope, technical roadmap, software architecture, credential lifecycle, verification workflows, and security considerations.

Then came the instruction that caught my attention.

The NDA was supposedly located in a separate branch of the repository named NDA.

That was unusual.

Why would a legal document need to be accessed through a Git branch?

Why couldn't a prospective client simply provide an NDA as a PDF or through a reputable electronic-signature platform?

And why was I being asked to work with a compressed software repository before we'd even had an introductory call?

Those questions made me investigate further instead of proceeding with the file.

Then I Discovered an Almost Identical Attack

While researching the archive filename and the unusual NDA instructions, I found a security report published by another software development agency, iVector, on September 29, 2026.

Their experience was remarkably similar to mine.

They had received what appeared to be a legitimate inquiry for an education credential verification platform.

The supposed client had provided a Dropbox archive with the exact same filename:

Education_Credential_Verification_Project.tar.gz

And just like in my experience, the sender instructed the developers to access an NDA through a separate Git branch.

The similarity wasn't limited to a generic project description. The same archive naming convention and unusual NDA workflow appeared in both cases.

According to iVector's published investigation, their archive contained a malicious Git post-checkout hook.

The purpose was to execute code when a developer switched branches to access the NDA.

That was the moment I realized this might not be a genuine development opportunity at all.

It appeared to match an existing malware delivery technique targeting software agencies.

Important distinction: I did not independently analyze the contents of the archive sent to Think1 Designs, so I cannot establish that it contained the same malware or came from the same attacker. However, the similarities to the documented incident were significant enough that I considered the request unsafe.

You can read the original research here:

Git Post-Checkout Hook Malware: A Fake Client Lure, iVector

How This Type of Attack Works

Here's what makes this technique dangerous.

Most developers are familiar with Git, the version control system used to manage software projects.

Git also supports something called hooks.

Hooks are scripts that can execute automatically when particular Git operations take place.

For example, a post-checkout hook can execute after a developer checks out files or switches branches.

In the attack documented by iVector, the malicious code wasn't hidden inside the NDA document.

It was hidden in the repository's Git configuration directory, specifically:

.git/hooks/post-checkout

When a developer switched to the NDA branch, the hook could trigger automatically.

The researchers reported that the script was designed to download and run additional code from an external server.

That means the attacker didn't necessarily need the victim to knowingly run an executable file.

The victim could believe they were simply following a client's instructions to review a legal document.

The use of a compressed archive was also significant. Unlike an ordinary Git clone, which does not transfer a remote repository's local hooks, an archive can include the entire .git directory and any hooks already stored inside it.

This creates a potential execution path when the extracted repository is used.

For development agencies, the risk extends far beyond one computer.

A compromised developer workstation could expose client repositories, SSH keys, API tokens, cloud credentials, environment files, and access to production systems.

That's what makes this style of attack especially concerning.

Why I Believe Development Agencies Are Attractive Targets

When someone sends a suspicious link to a random person, the goal might be to steal a password or financial information.

But software developers and agencies can have access to far more valuable digital infrastructure.

At Think1 Designs and Web Design Doers, our work involves website development, hosting, third-party integrations, cloud services, and application infrastructure.

We have a responsibility to protect our clients' environments, credentials, and business information.

A successful compromise of a development agency could potentially affect multiple businesses, not just the agency itself.

And attackers understand something important about how agencies operate.

We want new business.

A promising inquiry with a substantial budget naturally encourages us to respond quickly, review documents, and demonstrate technical expertise.

That makes the sales and discovery process an attractive entry point.

The attackers don't necessarily have to break through a firewall first. They can try to persuade a developer to perform an ordinary-looking workflow.

In this case, that workflow was supposedly reviewing an NDA.

The Red Flags I Won't Ignore Again

This experience reinforced several practices that I believe every agency should adopt.

1. Verify new business identities. Check company registration, domain history, official websites, and independently verifiable contact information before committing substantial resources.

2. Treat unexpected archives as untrusted. A Dropbox, Google Drive, or other reputable hosting link doesn't automatically make the downloadable content safe.

3. Be cautious when legal documents require development tools. An NDA should not normally require checking out a Git branch, installing dependencies, or executing project commands.

4. Never run unfamiliar project code on a trusted development machine. Untrusted repositories should be evaluated through controlled, isolated environments by someone qualified to examine them safely.

5. Protect client credentials. Development environments should use least-privilege access, secure credential management, and strong separation between projects wherever possible.

6. Don't let a large budget override your judgment. A $20,000, $50,000, or even $100,000 inquiry isn't worth risking your agency's infrastructure or your clients' security.

The lesson is not that every startup, new domain, NDA, or software archive is malicious.

It's that the combination of suspicious signals matters.

What This Experience Changed for My Agencies

This incident reminded me that cybersecurity isn't only about securing the websites and applications we build.

It also needs to be part of how we operate our businesses.

For Think1 Designs, that includes how we qualify new software development clients, review project documentation, and handle requests involving external code.

For Web Design Doers, it reinforces the importance of maintaining safe onboarding procedures even for smaller website projects.

Whether the proposed contract is worth a few hundred dollars or tens of thousands, the principle is the same.

A potential client's request should never bypass your security standards.

We can be welcoming, responsive, and professional without putting ourselves at unnecessary risk.

In fact, security-minded client onboarding should be viewed as part of providing a professional development service.

A Message to Other Developers and Agency Owners

If you operate a web design agency, development studio, IT consultancy, or freelance software business, pay attention to this type of approach.

The initial message may not look malicious.

It may contain a detailed project brief, a realistic budget, professional language, and a reasonable explanation for wanting confidentiality.

The dangerous instruction may arrive only after you've exchanged several friendly emails and started treating the sender as a serious prospect.

If something about the requested process feels unusual, investigate it before proceeding.

Check the source. Verify the sender. Review unfamiliar files through appropriate security procedures.

And remember that a legal document shouldn't require you to execute unfamiliar code.

Final Thoughts

When I first received this inquiry, I saw a potentially valuable custom software development opportunity.

After reviewing the communication and researching the documentation request, I saw something very different.

What concerned me wasn't simply the new domain or the Dropbox link. It was the combination of a confidential-document pretext, an unusual Git workflow, and an almost identical incident already documented by security researchers.

I can't say who was behind the inquiry or definitively identify the contents of the archive we were sent.

But I can say that the warning signs were strong enough to stop treating it as an ordinary lead.

For me, that is the most important takeaway.

Sometimes the most valuable decision an agency makes isn't accepting a promising project. It's recognizing when the risk isn't worth taking.

At Think1 Designs and Web Design Doers, we'll continue building websites, digital products, and custom software for businesses. We'll also continue putting security, due diligence, and client trust first.

Because protecting the businesses that trust us is just as important as the technology we build.

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About the Author

Oliver is the founder of Think1 Designs LLC and Web Design Doers, two web development brands focused on helping businesses establish and grow their digital presence through websites, custom applications, hosting, and technology solutions.

References and Further Reading

• iVector: Git Post-Checkout Hook Malware, A Fake Client Lure, September 29, 2026.
• Git Official Documentation: Git Hooks.
• FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, for reporting suspected cybercrime.